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Does naturalization cause better political integration of immigrants
into the host society? Despite heated debates about citizenship
policy, there exists almost no evidence that isolates the independent
effect of naturalization from the nonrandom selection into natural-
ization. We provide new evidence from a natural experiment in
Switzerland, where some municipalities used referendums as the
mechanism to decide naturalization requests. Balance checks sug-
gest that for close naturalization referendums, which are decided
by just a few votes, the naturalization decision is as good as ran-
dom, so that narrowly rejected and narrowly approved immigrant
applicants are similar on all confounding characteristics. This al-
lows us to remove selection effects and obtain unbiased estimates
of the long-term impacts of citizenship. Our study shows that for
the immigrants who faced close referendums, naturalization consid-
erably improved their political integration, including increases in for-
mal political participation, political knowledge, and political efficacy.
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citizenship
One of the key debates over immigration policy involves thepolitical integration of immigrants and their access to citi-
zenship. Some argue that immigrants should be given easy access
to citizenship and encouraged to naturalize because naturaliza-
tion provides immigrants with the necessary resources and in-
centives to rapidly integrate and invest in a future in the host
country. In this view, the acquisition of citizenship is an impor-
tant catalyst that has an independent effect on accelerating and
deepening the process of political integration. In contrast, others
argue that access to citizenship should be highly restricted be-
cause naturalization itself does little to foster integration. In fact,
naturalization is likely to dampen the incentives to integrate
because once immigrants are given the passport of the host so-
ciety, they can no longer be motivated to integrate by the promise
of obtaining the benefits that come with citizenship (e.g., access to
welfare benefits or the right to stay in the country indefinitely).
From this perspective, citizenship is not an instrument to improve
integration but merely a reward that is promised to immigrants
in exchange for successfully completing the integration process.
However, others argue that pressuring immigrants to naturalize
might backfire and simply reinforce immigrant identities.*
Does naturalization promote political integration? Despite the
importance of this question for the design of immigration and
citizenship policy and much theorizing among social scientists
and pundits, there exists little rigorous causal evidence on the
impacts of naturalization on the political integration of immi-
grants. Most studies only examine the impact of naturalization
on economic integration (see, for example, ref. 5), and the few
existing studies that consider effects on political integration by
comparing the political participation of naturalized and non-
naturalized immigrants are based on limited research designs
and data that prevent them from isolating the independent effect
of naturalization from a plethora of confounding factors (see, for
example, ref. 6 and references therein).
When trying to isolate the effect of naturalization, the key
problem for causal inference is that naturalization is far from ran-
domly assigned. Instead, the process through which immigrants
obtain citizenship involves a complex double selection process. In
the first stage, immigrants selectively apply for naturalization, and
this decision often depends on characteristics that are not observed
by the researcher. For example, immigrants who are more moti-
vated, have more resources, or are better informed are more likely
to apply (see, for example, refs. 7 and 8). In the second stage, de-
cision makers carefully select who among the applicants is approved
or rejected for citizenship. This screening is also based on charac-
teristics that are typically unobserved by the researcher. For ex-
ample, applicants who make a bad impression in the application
interview, have a low perceived integration potential, or lack suffi-
cient language skills might be more likely to be rejected.
This double selection process severely confounds the existing
comparisons of naturalized and nonnaturalized immigrants. For
example, if we find that naturalized immigrants are politically
more informed or earn higher wages than nonnaturalized im-
migrants, we cannot conclude that these differences are caused
by naturalization because the double selection ensures that the
two groups differ on the many important confounding charac-
teristics. Eliminating the bias from this double selection process
is a rather hopeless endeavor with typical observational data
because researchers cannot possibly measure and statistically
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control for the myriad reasons that determine why immigrants
apply and why decision makers approve or reject applications.
We provide new evidence that takes advantage of a natural
experiment to identify the long-term effects of naturalization on
the political integration of immigrants in Switzerland. Before
2003, some Swiss municipalities used secret ballot referendums
as the mechanism to decide on naturalization applications. Voters
received voting leaflets that informed them about the applicants
and then cast a secret ballot to approve or reject each applicant.
Immigrants who gained a majority of “yes” votes received the Swiss
passport. This setting allows us to remove the bias from the double
selection process.
In contrast to previous studies that do not measure whether
immigrants applied for citizenship or not, we can remove the
first-stage bias from selection into applying because we can re-
strict the comparison with only those immigrants who applied for
naturalization and faced referendums, thereby removing from
the control group those immigrants who were not motivated or
lacked the resources to apply. We can also remove the second-
stage bias from selection into approval using two different iden-
tification strategies. First, because we measure the same applicant
characteristics that were reported to voters when they voted on the
applicants, we can control for the characteristics that determined
the approval of applicants and identify the effect of naturalization
under a selection on observables assumption. In other words, once
we control for their reported characteristics, the applicants are
observably equivalent to voters, and therefore, they can no longer
screen applicants based on unobservable attributes, such as their
integration potential. Second, we can apply a regression disconti-
nuity (RD) design that compares the outcomes of immigrants whose
naturalization requests were barely approved or barely rejected by
voters. Balance checks suggest that in close referendums that are
decided within a narrow vote margin, who gets the Swiss passport
and who does not is essentially as good as randomly assigned.
Therefore, lucky applicants who are narrowly approved and unlucky
applicants who are narrowly rejected are similar on all confounding
characteristics, and any differences in their integration outcomes can
be attributed to the independent effect of naturalization.
What we find is that naturalization has a strong independent
effect on improving the long-term political integration among the
competitive immigrant applicants in our sample, including in-
creases in formal political participation, political knowledge, and
political efficacy. These effects are robust across the different
identification strategies and also large in substantive terms. For
example, when looking at our summary index of political inte-
gration that combines all outcomes, we find that naturalization
causes more than a full standard deviation (SD) unit increase in
the political integration index.
Our study makes four main contributions. First, we provide
new evidence of the effects of citizenship on the integration of
immigrants that takes advantage of a natural experiment where
naturalization is as good as randomly assigned. The results sug-
gest that naturalization can act as a catalyst that helps to turn
immigrants into “citizens” in the Tocquevillian sense. Second,
because the average naturalized immigrant in our sample ob-
tained the Swiss passport 13 y ago, we examine whether natu-
ralization has any long-term effects on incorporating immigrants
into the democratic process. Existing work typically only con-
siders short-term outcomes. Third, whereas most studies have
looked at the economic integration of immigrants, we provide
evidence on the effect of naturalization on the political inte-
gration of immigrants. The political integration of immigrants is
a major challenge for many countries that face rising immigrant
populations and anti-immigrant backlash among natives. Success-
fully incorporating immigrants into the political process matters
not only for the immigrants but also for the quality of the de-
mocracy in the host country because such integration enables im-
migrants to voice their grievances through legitimate electoral and
nonelectoral means rather than sporadic violence and terror.
Finally, our study fills a gap by examining the effect of naturali-
zation on political integration in Switzerland specifically, a country
where immigrant integration is a particularly controversial issue,
given the exceptionally large immigrant population (24%) and
rather divisive immigration debates in recent decades.
Materials and Methods
Setting. In Switzerland, naturalization requests are typically decided at the
local level, and municipalities use different procedures for these decisions (9,
10). Our study exploits that some municipalities, which we refer to as “ballot
box” municipalities, for several decades used popular votes with secret
ballots to decide on citizenship applications (ref. 9 describes this institution
in detail). Immigrants seeking naturalization had to apply with their local
municipality, and if deemed eligible, their naturalization request was put to
a popular vote. Resident citizens received an official voting leaflet with ré-
sumés that detailed information about each applicant, and voters then cast
a secret ballot to reject or approve each naturalization request. Applicants
who received a majority of “yes” votes were granted Swiss citizenship (see
the SI Appendix for further details about the process).
Identification Strategies. The use of naturalization referendums allows us to
address the double selection bias and thereby improve over existing research.
The first improvement is that we can remove the potent confounding that
comes from the selection into applying because we can restrict our comparison
with immigrants who were all sufficiently motivated enough to apply for Swiss
citizenship in the first place. The second improvement is that in the naturali-
zation referendums, we actually know the assignment mechanism that de-
termines why applicants are accepted and can exploit this for identification.
In particular, the unique situation allows for two identification strategies. First,
we can identify the effects of citizenship based on a selection on observables
assumption because we know and control for the applicant characteristics that
voters saw on the voting leaflets when they voted on the naturalization requests.
In otherwords, because voters base their decisions on the applicant characteristics
that we observe, once these covariates are controlled for, applicants are ob-
servably equivalent to voters such that they cannot strategically and systematically
screen applicants for citizenship based on their integration potential or other
unobserved characteristics that would confound the comparison. Therefore, in
our unique setup, controlling for the observable characteristics should be suffi-
cient to remove almost all of the omitted variable bias (see ref. 9 for further
evidence on the selection on observables assumptions).
One remaining caveat with this identification strategy is that a fraction of
applicants who were rejected in their first referendum subsequently reap-
plied and secured citizenship. Simply excluding these successful reapplicants
from the analysis would compromise the identification because the decision
to reapply is partially endogenous; more motivated immigrants might be
more likely to reapply. In addition, there is a possibility that decision makers
screen the reapplicants based on unobserved confounding characteristics.
Many of the reapplications occurred after 2003 and were therefore not
decided in referendums but by politicians in the municipality council. In these
cases, we cannot be sure that our covariates capture all of the relevant
characteristics that determined the decisions on the reapplications.
Fortunately, we can address this problem using an instrumental variable
(IV) approach where identification relies solely on the exogenous variation in
naturalization that comes from whether applicants won their first referen-
dums. We follow the IV framework developed by Angrist et al. (11), which
allows for heterogeneous treatment effects. We can view the outcome of
the first referendum as an exogenous “encouragement,” where winning
applicants are encouraged to obtain citizenship and losing applicants are
discouraged from obtaining citizenship. Because applicants who win their
first referendum automatically obtain citizenship, we only have two types of
applicants in our sample: “compliers” and “always takers” (11). Compliers
are those applicants who are motivated to apply only once. Compliers obtain
Swiss citizenship when they win their first referendum but do not reapply
and subsequently naturalize when they lose their first referendum. In other
words, such applicants “comply” with the encouragement, and therefore
their naturalization status is exogenously determined by the outcome of
their first referendum. Always takers are applicants who do not comply with
the encouragement because they always obtain Swiss citizenship, regardless
of the outcome of their first referendum. If always takers win, they obtain
Swiss citizenship, but if they loose, they reapply and subsequently naturalize
nonetheless. The IV strategy addresses this noncompliance by taking the
(covariate-adjusted) difference in the outcomes between accepted and
rejected applicants (the so called intention-to-treat effect) and scaling the
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difference in the outcomes by the fraction of compliers (the so-called com-
pliance ratio) to isolate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of natu-
ralization among compliers (11).†
Our second identification strategy is a RD design that takes advantage of
close referendums and compares lucky applicants who won their naturali-
zation referendum by a few votes and obtained the Swiss passport with
unlucky applicants who lost their referendum by a few votes and did not
receive the Swiss passport (12). In close referendums, the outcome is largely
decided by random factors (e.g., the weather on the day of the referendum,
current events, etc.), so that lucky immigrants who are narrowly approved
are on average similar to unlucky immigrants who are narrowly rejected,
and therefore differences in their integration outcomes can be attributed to
the effect of citizenship as opposed to differences in unobserved background
factors. In other words, in this quasiexperimental comparison, the applicant
characteristics are controlled for “by design” because in close referendums,
citizenship is as if it were randomly assigned in an experiment. The key RD
identification assumption is that the potential outcomes are continuous at the
threshold (13). This assumption would fail if immigrants had precise control
over their referendum outcomes and could sort around the threshold, but this
is implausible in large elections such as our secret ballot referendums, where
the outcome is clearly beyond the control of the individual applicants.
Fig. 1 illustrates the RD logic and previews the main result. In Fig. 1, Upper
Left, we plot the applicants’ years of education, as reported on the leaflets
at the time of the referendums, against the vote share margin from the
applicants’ first naturalization referendum. The vote margin is the differ-
ence between the share of “yes” votes and the 50% victory threshold that
applicants had to exceed to win their referendum. Applicants with positive
(negative) margins to the right (left) of the threshold reached a majority
(minority) of “yes” votes and were granted (denied) Swiss citizenship. The
red and blue fitted lines from a Loess smoother summarize the average years
of education for a given vote share on both sides of the threshold, re-
spectively. The dots are binned averages with 95% confidence intervals.
In close referendums that are decided by just a few votes, who wins and
who loses is as good as randomly assigned, and therefore, just as in a truly
randomized experiment, close winners and close losers have similar levels of
education. SI Appendix, Figs. S3–S6 report similar balance checks that show
that barely accepted and barely rejected applicants are similar on many
other pretreatment characteristics, including the year of the referendum,
their age, sex, prior residency in Switzerland, country of origin, or the av-
erage municipality size.
Fig. 1, Upper Right shows another key identification check, where we plot
the estimated density of the vote margin on both sides of the threshold. If
naturalization is beneficial and applicants had precise control over the
outcome of their referendums, then we would expect them to sort around
the threshold, and we should therefore see an unusually large (small)
number of applicants with vote shares just above (below) the threshold (14).
Instead, we find that there is no discontinuity in the density at the threshold,
indicating that applicants were not able to sort around the threshold.
Fig. 1, Lower Left previews one of the main findings. We plot the applicants’
score on the political integration scale, our summary measure that combines all
integration outcomes, against the vote margin. We see that levels of political
integration as measured by the political integration scale sharply increase by
about 0.15 right at the threshold. This intention-to-treat effect, which amounts
to about a third of a SD unit increase on the integration scale, is causally at-
tributable to the effect of winning the referendum, given that who wins and
who looses in close referendum is as good as randomly assigned.
Note that this intention-to-treat effect underestimates the actual effect of
naturalization because a sizable share of those who barely lost subsequently
reapplied and received Swiss citizenship. We can correct for this non-
compliance by using a fuzzy RD design where, similar to the IV strategy, the
intention-to-treat effect is scaled by the compliance ratio at the threshold to
isolate the LATEof naturalization for compliers in close referendums (13). Fig. 1,
Lower Right shows the first-stage effect, where we plot the proportion of
naturalized applicants against the vote share margin. We see that the prob-
ability of naturalization jumps by about 0.28 at the threshold. Accordingly, the
LATE of naturalization for compliers at the threshold is estimated at about
0.15/0.28 = 0.53, which implies that naturalization caused more than a full SD
unit increase on the political integration scale.
The two identification strategies are complementary. The IV strategy
provides more precision because it identifies the LATE for compliers in the
whole estimation sample, but we have to statistically adjust for the covar-
iates. The RD strategy is more nonparametric because we control for the
covariates by design, but we lose precision and external validity because we
identify the LATE for compliers in close referendums.
Sample. Our study draws on the data collected by Hainmueller and Hangartner
(9), who extracted frommunicipal archives all of the voting and applicant data
for all immigrants whose naturalization requests were decided by such ref-
erendums in all 46 ballot box municipalities between 1970 and 2003. In 2003,
the Swiss court ruled that secret ballot naturalization referendums could no
longer be used (SI Appendix, Tables S1 and S2 provide details on the sample).
These data give us a rich set of pretreatment covariates that determine the
selection into citizenship conditional on applying. The covariates include the
immigrants’ age, education, country of origin, years since arrival in Switzerland,
and time period and municipality fixed effects.
To measure political integration, we conducted a survey of the immigrants
included in the ref. 9 sample. The survey was conducted at the University of
Fig. 1. Fuzzy RD design: identification checks and the effect of naturalization on political integration. Upper Left shows that the applicants’ (pretreatment)
years of education are well balanced at the vote threshold for winning the naturalization referendum. Upper Right shows that there is no discontinuity in the
density of the vote margin variable, indicating that applicants are not sorting around the threshold of winning. Lower Left and Lower Right show that barely
winning versus barely losing the referendum increased levels of political integration and the probability of naturalization, respectively. Loess lines; 95% confidence
intervals for binned averages (dots).
†Noncompliance can only occur in the group of applicants who lost their first referendum,
and therefore there are no “never takers” (i.e., applicants who never obtain citizenship)
or “defiers” (i.e., applicants who obtain citizenship if they lose but not if they win). The
one-sided noncompliance also implies that the LATE is equal to the average treatment
effect on the untreated.
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Zurich according to its policy for human subjects research. Informed consent
was obtained from each participant at the beginning of the survey. Details
about the survey are provided in the SI Appendix. Overall, we successfully
identified and interviewed 768 immigrants, which corresponds to a cumu-
lative response rate (RR3) as defined by the American Association for Public
Opinion Research of 34.5% (45.9% among the competitive applicants with
vote margins within ±15% around the threshold of winning). As we explain
in the SI Appendix, this response rate is much higher than typical response
rates for similar surveys.
One possible concern is that the probability of being interviewed is cor-
related with naturalization. SI Appendix, Fig. S2 and Table S3 show that this
is not the case in our study. In fact, the probability of being interviewed and
the characteristics of those interviewed are virtually identical for closely
accepted and closely rejected immigrants.
Outcomes. For the outcomes, we measured four standard indicators of po-
litical integration. The first outcome captures formal political participation
and consists of a binary indicator coded as one for immigrants who report
that they voted in the last federal parliamentary election in Switzerland and
zero otherwise. Note that in Switzerland and most other democratic coun-
tries, a central feature of naturalization is that naturalized immigrants ac-
quire the right to vote in federal elections (6). Because nonnaturalized
immigrants do not have the right to vote, their turnout is legally constrained
to be zero. Therefore, the effect of naturalization on turnout is constrained
to be nonnegative, and so for this outcome, we are purely interested in
the magnitude of the potential effect rather than the sign. In other words,
the question is how commonly naturalized immigrants who are otherwise
similar to nonnaturalized immigrants do actually exercise their newly ac-
quired right to vote in Swiss federal elections or not.
The second outcome captures political efficacy using a standard question
that asks respondents whether they agree with the statement that “people
like me don’t have any influence on the government.” Answers are recorded
on a five-point scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,”
and we standardized the codings to vary from 0 to 1 for comparability.
The third outcome captures political knowledge and is measured using the
number of correct answers to two standard knowledge questions about the
name of the current Swiss Federal President and the number of signatures
required for a federal initiative.We again standardized the number of correct
answers to vary from 0 to 1 for comparability.
The fourth outcome captures informal political participation. This out-
come consists of a binary indicator that measures whether immigrants report
that they participated in any of the following activities in the last 12 mo:
contacted a politician, worked in a political party, displayed a campaign sticker,
participated in a political demonstration, collected signatures for a petition,
boycotted a product for political reasons, donated money to a political party, or
persuaded others to vote.
As a final outcome, we also build a political integration scale that combines
the four outcomes by extracting the first component of a polychoric principal
component analysis (PCA) (15). This first component explains 51% of the
total variance (Eigenvalue, 2.04). The SI Appendix provides details on the
PCA. Averaging responses across multiple items is an effective strategy to
reduce bias from random measurement error that is common in survey re-
search. This strategy also provides a succinct summary measure for the
multiple metrics of political integration. We calibrate the scale to have mean
zero and a SD of 0.5 to make it comparable to the other outcomes.
It is worth emphasizing that one unique feature about our design is that it
allows us tomeasure the long-term effects of naturalization. Because our survey
was conducted in 2011–2014, and the use of naturalization referendums ended
in 2003, for most applicants, there is a long gap between the time of the
measure of the outcomes and the time of the receipt of Swiss citizenship (13 y
on average). Our estimates, therefore, will pick up only lasting effects that
naturalization might have on integrating immigrants into the political fabric of
the host society. This rules out the possibility that our findings are driven by
pure short-term effects, such as, for example, a temporary increase in political
knowledge that results from applicants studying Swiss politics just to pass the
application interview. To the best of our knowledge, there currently exists no
causal evidence on the long-terms effects of naturalization.
Results
In Fig. 2, we present the effect estimates from the different iden-
tification strategies. In SI Appendix, Tables S5–S7, we report the
regression tables. For all estimations, we restricted the sample to
include only competitive applicants who obtained enough “yes”
votes to come within a 15% window around the threshold of
winning (i.e., applicants who scored between 35 and 65% of
“yes” votes). In SI Appendix, Figs. S7–S9, we show that the
estimates are fairly similar for different windows ranging from
10% to 25%. For smaller windows, our sample size is too limited
to reliably estimate the treatment effect at the threshold with the
fuzzy RD design.
Instrumental Variable Estimates. To estimate the effect of natu-
ralization, we fit two-stage least-squares models in which we
regress the outcomes on a binary naturalization indicator, coded
one for immigrants who received Swiss citizenship and zero for
those who did not, and also control for the applicant background
characteristics reported in the voting leaflets as well as a full set
of municipality and time period fixed effects. We instrument the
naturalization dummy with a binary instrument that codes whether
immigrants won or lost their first naturalization referendum and
were therefore encouraged to obtain or discouraged from obtain-
ing Swiss citizenship.
We fit the first-stage equation by regressing naturalization
status on the covariates, the vote margin, and the instrument (SI
Appendix, Table S4). Consistent with Fig. 1, Lower Left, we find
that the instrument has a strong effect on naturalization. Closely
winning versus closely losing the first referendum increased the
probability of obtaining Swiss citizenship by about 30 percentage
points, and this finding is robust across a variety of specifications.
This compliance ratio, which implies that there are about 30%
compliers and about 70% always takers, is sufficiently high so
that we avoid the problem of weak instruments [the F statistic for
the relevance of the instrument is 20 for the preferred specifi-
cation—which far exceeds the standard threshold of 10 (16)].
The blue estimates in Fig. 2 show the IV estimates of the effect
of citizenship for compliers. We find that naturalization strongly
improved the political integration of immigrants in our estima-
tion sample. Comparing naturalized and nonnaturalized immi-
grants who were otherwise similar on the reported characteristics
and therefore observably equivalent to voters, naturalization results
in about a 0.61 increase in the political integration index that
combines all of the integration outcomes (P < 0.0001, two-tailed).
Fig. 2. Naturalization improves the political integration of immigrants. The
figure shows point estimates and robust 95% (thin) and 90% (bold) con-
fidence intervals from instrumental variable and fuzzy RD design models.
Outcomes were as follows: political integration scale (mean, 0; SD, 0.5);
voted in last election (0/1); political efficacy (0–1); political knowledge
(0, 0.5, 1); and informal political participation (0/1). Covariates include
reported applicant characteristics and fixed effects for municipality and
time period. The sample includes all applicants within a window ±15%
margin of the threshold.
12654 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1418794112 Hainmueller et al.
This effect is large in substantive terms: given that the index has a
SD of 0.5, this means that naturalization boosted long-term polit-
ical integration by about a full SD unit.
Looking at the outcomes separately, we see that the effects are
consistent across measures. We find that newly naturalized im-
migrants who are otherwise similar to nonnaturalized immigrants
had a turnout of 58 percentage points in the last parliamentary
election in Switzerland. This level of voting is striking consider-
ing that the reported average turnout among rooted natives who
have been Swiss since birth was 52% according to the Swiss
election survey. This suggests that newly naturalized immigrants
voted at similar rates as Swiss natives. We also find that natu-
ralization has a strong effect on improving the political efficacy
of immigrants with a 0.25 increase on the 0–1 scale of believing
that one has an influence on the government. Given that the
average level of efficacy among nonnaturalized immigrants is
0.44, this effect corresponds to about a 57% increase over the
baseline level. Similarly, we find that naturalization resulted in
immigrants becoming much more politically informed, with an
increase of 0.28 on the 0–1 scale of answering the knowledge
questions; this corresponds to about half of a question more
answered correctly by naturalized immigrants or about a 104%
increase over the average level of political knowledge among the
nonnaturalized immigrants, which is 0.27. This increase is re-
markable given that we interviewed respondents on the phone,
when they were unprepared for the political quiz and could not
easily look up the answers as in a self-completion survey. It is
also remarkable given that naturalization raises immigrants’ av-
erage political knowledge to a level that is similar to that mea-
sured for rooted natives who have been Swiss since birth (which
is about 0.52 according to the 2011 Selects survey that asked
similar questions). Finally, we find that naturalization led to a 12
percentage point increase in informal political participation, but
this effect is far from statistically significant at conventional
levels (P < 0.36). This finding is partly attributable to the fact
that most immigrants do not engage in informal participation,
and therefore there is little variation in this outcome variable.
For example, only 8% of the nonnaturalized immigrants engage
in informal political participation.
Fuzzy RD Design Estimates. The green estimates in Fig. 2 show the
results from the fuzzy RD design that identifies the naturalization
effect for compliers in close referendums based on local linear two-
stage least-square regressions, where the slopes of the vote margin
are allowed to vary on both sides of the threshold. The results are
similar to the IV estimates, and the magnitudes are, if anything,
slightly higher for all outcomes except informal participation. As
expected, the RD estimates are less precise given the local iden-
tification for compliers at the threshold. Naturalization increases
the political integration index by 0.83 (P < 0.002), the probability of
voting by 64 percentage points, political efficacy by 0.39 (or 89%
over the baseline level), and political knowledge by about 0.52 (or
193% over the baseline level). The effect on informal political
participation is 17 percentage points and again far from significant
at conventional levels (P < 0.49).
Finally, to check the design-based RD identification, the red
estimates show the effects that we obtain when replicating the
RD model while dropping all of the covariates (except the vote
margin). If the naturalization decision in close referendums is as
good as random, then just like in a randomized experiment,
controlling or not controlling for the baseline covariates should
not considerably change the effect estimates because the covar-
iates (and also unobservables) are well balanced by design. The
estimates are almost identical with and without the covariates,
which corroborates the RD identification.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that naturalization
caused large and long-lasting improvements in political integration
among the competitive immigrant applicants in our sample. The
results are consistent across the different identification strategies
and various measures of political integration (except informal
participation). These long-term increases in political integration
are remarkable given that outcomes like voting, political efficacy,
or political knowledge are often seen as fairly stable attributes that
are formed in early socialization but then rarely change over time.
However, among otherwise similar immigrants, naturalization sub-
stantially increases political engagement to a new level, where more
than two decades later, naturalized immigrants vote at the same
rates and possess similar levels of political information as rooted
natives who have been Swiss since birth. This suggests that natu-
ralization acts as a critical juncture where barely rejected immi-
grants remain disengaged from the political process, whereas barely
accepted immigrants are propelled to become integrated to a level
that is similar to that of rooted natives.
Discussion
Effect Heterogeneity. One important question for policy and
theory is whether the naturalization effect varies for different
immigrant groups. To investigate this, we examined whether the
naturalization effect differs by the origin of the immigrants, their
level of education, and their prior residency in Switzerland. We
find that the effects of naturalization are remarkably stable across
these different groups of immigrants (SI Appendix, Tables S8–S13).
Naturalization improved political integration for groups that are
less socially marginalized to begin with, such as immigrants who are
born in Switzerland, immigrants with higher education levels, and
immigrants from richer European origin countries. However, we
see similar naturalization effects among more socially marginalized
groups, such as immigrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia, immi-
grants who are born abroad, and immigrants with lower education
levels. This stability in the effects suggests that we might expect
similar positive integration returns if the stringent residency re-
quirements for naturalization were to be lowered.
Alienation or Integration. Which mechanisms might be driving the
naturalization effects? Although a full analysis of the mechanisms is
clearly beyond the scope of this study, our data can shed some light
on distinguishing between two broader mechanisms. One possibility
is that the acquisition of citizenship turns immigrants into active and
well-integrated participants of the democratic process. Another
possibility is that the act of being rejected alienates applicants from
the political process and the host country society such that the
rejected applicants’ political integration drops lower than it would
have been had they never applied for naturalization. Distinguishing
these two mechanisms is difficult given that naturalization decisions
always involve either an acceptance or rejection. However, one
possibility is to examine outcomes that are especially sensitive to
one specific mechanism. To test for a potential alienation effect, we
replicate our models using three measures that capture the degree
to which respondents distrust other people, the judicial system, or
the local authorities (see the SI Appendix for details). If applicants
are alienated because they are rejected on discriminatory grounds,
then we would expect them to show higher levels of distrust than
accepted applicants. This distrust would be directed either toward
other people who cast the discriminatory votes in local referen-
dums, the local authorities who processed the naturalization ap-
plications but did nothing to prevent the discrimination, or the
courts who might have failed to overturn discriminatory rejections
upon appeal. The findings, displayed in SI Appendix, Fig. S10,
contradict the idea of a long-lasting alienation effect. Naturaliza-
tion has no effect on all three distrust measures; point estimates
are close to zero and insignificant. This suggests that the effects of
naturalization work mainly through accepted immigrants becom-
ing more politically integrated than they would be in the absence
of naturalization, rather than through an alienation effect.
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Conclusion
This study examined the long-term effect of Swiss citizenship on the
political integration of immigrants. We exploited a natural experi-
ment in that some municipalities used referendums to decide on
naturalization requests of immigrants. This allowed us to isolate the
effects of naturalization from the nonrandom selection into natu-
ralization. Using two identification strategies and multiple outcomes
and robustness checks, we found that in our sample of competitive
applicants, naturalization has a strong effect in generating lasting
improvements in political integration. Comparing among other-
wise similar immigrants, those immigrants who barely won their
referendums and therefore received the Swiss passport developed
high levels of turnout, efficacy, and political knowledge similar to
that of rooted natives, whereas those immigrants who barely lost
their referendums and were therefore rejected to receive the Swiss
passport remained fairly disengaged from the political process.
These effects persist for more than a decade. The findings have
important implications for the design of immigration and citi-
zenship policy. The findings clearly support those who argue that
naturalization has important independent effects in accelerating
political integration and helps turn immigrants into “citizens” in the
Tocquevillian sense. Moreover, the finding that the positive effects
of naturalization on integration are stable across very different
immigrant groups suggests that lowering the stringent residency
requirements might be beneficial to realize the full integration
gains from naturalizations. Clearly, more work is needed to identify
the effects of citizenship in other contexts and for other outcomes.
Further work is also needed to better ascertain the mechanisms
through which naturalization increases political integration.
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